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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Michael K. Leggett appeals from a judgment of conviction 
and sentence entered in the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania. He was convicted of 
assaulting a prison official in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 111. 
Leggett makes three claims on appeal: (1) the district court 
erred in not ordering sua sponte a competency hearing 
before the commencement of the trial, (2) the district court 
failed to ensure that Leggett validly waived his right to 
testify, and (3) the district court improperly concluded that 
Leggett forfeited his right to counsel at sentencing when he 
physically attacked his attorney. We find each of Leggett's 
claims to be without merit and will therefore affirm the 




In February 1994, Leggett, who was serving a prison term 
for bank robbery and assault at a federal penitentiary in 
Indiana, was transferred to the Allenwood Federal 
Correctional Complex in White Deer, Pennsylvania. Upon 
his arrival at Allenwood, Leggett resided in a single cell. On 
April 19 of that year, Dr. Stephen Karten, Allenwood's chief 
psychologist, recommended that Leggett remain in a single 
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cell due to his inability to live peacefully with another 
inmate. However, due to an influx of new inmates, some 
single-cell inmates had to be relocated to double cells. On 
April 21, Leggett's name was taken off the list of inmates 
eligible for single cells, and Leggett was required to move 
his belongings to another cell in anticipation of being 
assigned a cellmate. 
 
Donn Troutman served as Leggett's unit manager at this 
time and was responsible for Leggett's housing assignment. 
When Leggett discovered that he was losing his single-cell 
status, he went to Troutman's office to complain. Leggett 
told Troutman that he had been waiting all day to speak to 
him and, after Troutman stepped outside his office, Leggett 
punched him in the face. Leggett attempted additional 
blows which were deflected by Troutman. Leggett then 
grabbed Troutman's necktie and tried to strangle him with 
it. Eventually, Troutman, who was five inches taller and 
fifty pounds heavier than Leggett, was able to subdue him 
with the assistance of several prison guards. Troutman 
suffered multiple cuts to his face as a result of the attack. 
 
An assistant federal public defender, D. Toni Byrd, was 
assigned to represent Leggett at his trial for the assault on 
Troutman. However, due to disputes between Leggett and 
Byrd concerning jury selection and delay of the trial, 
Leggett sought to discharge Byrd and requested the 
appointment of new counsel. On July 26, 1995, the district 
court held a hearing at which Leggett and Byrd explained 
the bases for their disagreements. After the hearing, the 
district court denied Leggett's motion to dismiss his 
counsel. Nevertheless, several days later, Byrd sought leave 
to withdraw from the case, due mainly to threats of 
physical harm.2 The district court allowed Byrd to withdraw 




2. Byrd, who was several months' pregnant, referred to statements by 
Leggett that beating up a pregnant woman would make him "look bad" 
and that he hit a federal public defender who had been assigned to 
represent him in an unrelated matter in Ohio. Supplemental Appendix at 
10. 
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Gardner represented Leggett throughout the trial, which 
began on November 3, 1995, and continued on November 
7, 8 and 9. At one point during the trial (on November 8), 
Gardner expressed concern to the district court that 
Leggett, against the advice of counsel, wished to testify. The 
district court expressly encouraged Leggett to heed 
Gardner's advice. On the following day, at the close of 
evidence, Leggett had not yet testified and the district court 
asked Gardner at sidebar whether the defense had any 
further evidence to present. Gardner indicated that the 
defense had nothing further. On November 13, the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty. 
 
In the ensuing months, Leggett, both with the assistance 
of Gardner and pro se, moved to set aside the verdict and 
issued objections to the presentence report. The district 
court denied the motions, overruled the objections, and set 
sentencing for March 25, 1996. On March 25, Leggett 
entered the courtroom in the company of two United States 
Marshals. Upon seeing Gardner in the courtroom, Leggett 
lunged at his attorney and punched him in the head, 
knocking him to the ground. While Gardner lay, supine, 
Leggett straddled him and began to choke, scratch and spit 
on him. The Marshals and a probation officer restrained 
Leggett and removed him from the courtroom. Gardner was 
taken to a hospital by emergency medical personnel and 
treated for cuts, scratches and bruises. The district court 
then allowed Gardner to withdraw as counsel and 
concluded that Leggett had forfeited his right to counsel for 
the sentencing hearing. 
 
In April 1996, Leggett moved for a competency hearing. 
The district court granted this motion so that it could 
determine whether Leggett was competent to represent 
himself at sentencing. The district court appointed yet 
another attorney, Thomas Thornton, to represent Leggett 
solely at the competency hearing. In October 1996, the 
district court conducted the competency hearing, at which 
it heard testimony from various mental-health professionals 
concerning Leggett's behavior. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the district court reaffirmed its decision that 
Leggett had forfeited his right to counsel and concluded 
that he was competent to represent himself at sentencing. 
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In November 1996, Leggett appeared for sentencing without 
counsel. The district court imposed a sentence of 36 
months' imprisonment to be served consecutively to the 





On appeal, Leggett makes the following three claims: (1) 
the district court erred in declining sua sponte to order a 
competency hearing before the start of the trial, (2) the 
district court improperly failed to make certain that Leggett 
validly waived his right to testify during the trial, and (3) 
the district court erroneously concluded that Leggett 
forfeited his right to counsel at sentencing. The district 
court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
A. The Pre-Trial Competency Hearing 
 
We will first consider Leggett's claim that the district 
court erred in declining to conduct a competency hearing 
before the trial began. Since we must decide whether the 
district court properly applied the standard for determining 
the necessity of a competency hearing, our review is 
plenary. United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 766 (3d 
Cir. 1987). We note that, if the proper legal standard has 
been applied, factual findings regarding competency are 
reviewed for clear error. United States v. Velasquez, 885 
F.2d 1076, 1089 (3d Cir. 1989); Renfroe, 825 F.2d at 766 
n.4. 
 
Fundamental to an adversarial system of justice is the 
precept that "a person whose mental condition is such that 
[the person] lacks the capacity to understand the nature 
and the object of the proceedings[,] . . . to consult with 
counsel, and to assist in preparing [a] defense may not be 
subjected to a trial." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 
(1975). The conviction of a legally incompetent defendant 
violates due process. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 
(1966). In keeping with this unwillingness to try 
incompetents, we have a statutory directive providing that 
a criminal defendant whose competency is in question may 
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be subjected to a competency hearing. 18 U.S.C. S 4241(a).3 
If neither the defendant nor the government moves for such 
a hearing, the trial court may do so on its own motion. Id. 
To do so, however, the trial court must have "reasonable 
cause" to believe that the defendant is "presently" suffering 
from an impairment resulting in mental incompetency. Id.; 
see also Renfroe, 825 F.2d at 766-77 (holding that court 
must have "reasonable doubt" as to defendant's ability to 
grasp proceedings to order a competency hearing); United 
States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1290 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting 
that district court must have " `reasonable cause to believe' 
the defendant [is] incompetent") (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
S 4241(a)); United States v. George, 85 F.3d 1433, 1437 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (stating that a finding of "reasonable cause" 
dictates whether a court conducts a competency hearing); 
United States v. Lebron, 76 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.) (same), 
cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1011 (1996); United States v. Nichols, 
56 F.3d 403, 414 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. 
Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358, 1375 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming 
district court's denial of motion for competency hearing 
based on absence of reasonable cause to doubt defendant's 
competency); United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 266 
(5th Cir. 1993) (affirming district court's denial of motion 
for psychiatric examination due to absence of reasonable 
cause to doubt defendant's competency). 
 
A defendant is competent to stand trial if (1) the 
defendant has the " `present ability to consult with [defense 
counsel] with a reasonable degree of rational 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 4241 states in pertinent part: 
 
       At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense 
       and prior to the sentencing of the defendant, the defendant or the 
       attorney for the Government may file a motion for a hearing to 
       determine the mental competency of the defendant. The court shall 
       grant the motion or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, 
       if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may 
       presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering 
him 
       mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand 
       the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to 
       assist properly in his defense. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 4241(a). 
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understanding' " and (2) the defendant has a " `rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings.' " Drope, 
420 U.S. at 172 (quoting Dusky v. United States , 362 U.S. 
402, 402 (1960)); Renfroe, 825 F.2d at 766-77; Lebron, 76 
F.3d at 31; Nichols, 56 F.3d at 410; United States v. 
Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d 480, 489 (1st Cir. 1994). In 
determining whether a defendant satisfies this two-prong 
test, a court must consider a number of factors, including: 
"evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, [the 
defendant's] demeanor at trial, and any prior medical 
opinion on competence to stand trial." Drope, 420 U.S. at 
180. However, due to the vicissitudes of all cases, a court 
must be cognizant that "[t]here are . . . nofixed or 
immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for [a 
competency hearing]." Id. There is no predetermined 
formula for making a finding of reasonable cause. A court 
must simply look at the unique circumstances of the case 
and decide whether the defendant (1) has the capacity to 
assist in her or his own defense and (2) comprehends the 
nature and possible consequences of a trial. If either prong 
is not met, a court has reasonable cause to order a 
competency hearing. We will now consider whether Leggett 
satisfied these criteria. 
 
Leggett argues that his inability to assist in his own 
defense was evident from the July 26 pre-trial hearing at 
which he sought the dismissal of Byrd, his then-trial 
counsel. At that hearing, Byrd expressed her concern that 
Leggett's recalcitrance impeded her ability to mount a 
defense when she stated, "I do question whether he has an 
ability to assist his counsel, which is [a] prong of the 
competency evaluation." Nonetheless, Byrd emphasized that 
she was not formally moving for a competency evaluation. 
During the hearing, moreover, Leggett gave no indication 
that he would be incapable of assisting in his defense. 
Although he was at times obstreperous, he did demonstrate 
an ability to serve his own interests before the court. Over 
the course of the hearing, Leggett -- without the assistance 
of counsel -- cross-examined two witnesses, one of whom 
was Byrd. Furthermore, he made sure he preserved on the 
record any court ruling he perceived to be in error. For 
example, when the district court refused to appoint counsel 
for the pre-trial hearing, Leggett responded, "I want to cite 
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that as error. I object to that." Leggett even feigned 
ignorance of basic courtroom procedure in a thinly veiled 
effort to support his contention that the district court erred 
in not appointing counsel. When the district court asked 
Leggett whether he understood that he could not interrupt 
a witness who was trying to answer a question, Leggett 
declared, "No, I don't understand that because I'm not a 
lawyer. . . . And you told me I couldn't have no lawyer so 
I'm doing the best I can." Based on Leggett's handling of the 
hearing, the district court concluded, "[I]t seems to me from 
what he said today, he's on top of this case extremely. And 
I don't know how a client could be more assistive, if there's 
such a word . . .. " 
 
We agree with the district court's conclusion that Leggett 
seemed more than capable of assisting in his own defense. 
His exchanges with the district court manifested a working 
knowledge not only of trial tactics but also of the 
importance of underscoring potential errors on the record 
as grounds for appeal. In similar cases, other courts of 
appeals have interpreted a defendant's ability to participate 
in court proceedings as a sign of competency. In United 
States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1997), a 
defendant argued that a district court erred in denying a 
motion for a competency examination because the 
defendant allegedly suffered from a " `split personality.' " 
The court of appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this 
argument, noting that the defendant "took notes, conversed 
with counsel, and reacted reasonably to the admission of 
evidence." Id. These actions supported the Sovie court's 
conclusion that the defendant was "a knowing participant 
in his defense." 122 F.3d at 128. 
 
In Williams, the court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
confronted the same issue when a defendant appealed from 
a district court's denial of a motion for a mental 
examination to determine competency. 998 F.2d 264-67. 
Although the trial record showed that the defendant tended 
to become " `extremely agitated' " and incoherent, the 
Williams court affirmed the district court's decision. Id. at 
265-66. Despite the defendant's unruly behavior at trial, 
the court of appeals concluded that he was "rational and 
able to assist his attorney," id. at 266, based on the 
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following: (1) the defendant had "advised [counsel] to file 
certain motions, including the motion for a mental 
examination"; (2) a short period before moving for a mental 
examination, the defendant "had been handling pro se a 
custody case involving his son"; and (3) in connection with 
the custody case, the defendant had "filed numerous 
coherent briefs [in a] state court, challenging its jurisdiction 
over him." Id. at 265. 
 
Leggett appeared to be just as able to contribute to his 
defense as the defendants in Sovie and Williams. His 
untoward antics aside, he made a clear effort at the hearing 
to present arguments and evidence favorable to his 
position. There was no reason to believe that he would not 
act with the same purpose of mind once the trial itself 
began and he had the services of counsel at his disposal. In 
fact, Leggett's desire to have Byrd discharged was at least 
partially grounded in what he considered poor strategic 
decisions on her part and her failure to get him copies of 
various evidentiary documents.4 It would have indeed been 
oxymoronic if the district court had ruled sua sponte that 
the defendant could not aid in his defense because he had 
too keen an interest in that defense. Leggett's reasons for 
seeking Byrd's discharge stemmed from his relationship 
with that particular lawyer and did not seem indicative of 
a general incapacity to consult with any lawyer. 
Accordingly, the district court allowed Byrd to withdraw 
and appointed Gardner in her place. The district court 
advisedly refrained from reading a competency issue into 
the mere incompatibility of a defendant and one particular 
lawyer. The clarity and zeal with which Leggett pursued 
Byrd's discharge gave the district court no reasonable 
cause to believe that he was unable to assist counsel in his 
defense. See George, 85 F.3d at 1438 (affirming district 
court's denial of defendant's motion for psychological 
evaluation since defendant was " `lucid,' " " `articulate' " and 
" `intelligen[t]' "); Morgano, 39 F.3d at 1374 (affirming 
district court's denial of defendant's motion for competency 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Leggett mainly disagreed with Byrd on matters relating to jury 
selection and adjustment of the trial's start date. He also maintained 
that she had not obtained copies of various memoranda such as reports 
from Dr. Karten, the prison's chief psychologist. 
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hearing in case where, in defense counsel's judgment, 
defendant "had been helpful and more cooperative than the 
average criminal defendant in assisting in preparation for 
trial"). 
 
We will next consider whether the district court had 
reasonable cause, at the July 26 pretrial hearing, to believe 
that Leggett did not have a rational and factual 
understanding of the hearing and of the pending trial.5 
Leggett points to portions of the hearing's transcript in 
which he rants about his mental impairments as evidence 
that he could not grasp the nature and consequences of the 
proceedings. At several points, Leggett mentioned that he 
has "brain damage" and suffers from "schizophrenia."6 
Without even discussing the self-serving nature of these 
comments, what precious little probative value they had 
was undercut by Leggett's own admission that his 
impairments did not affect his comprehension of legal 
concepts, such as waiver: 
 
       [A]nyway, I knew exactly, you know, what it-- what it 
       is to waive a right. You know, this is not my first time 
       in court. You know, I'm not stupid. I'm [sic] may suffer 
       from a little brain damage, a little schizophrenia, but I 
       ain't never been stupid. I understand what waiving 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note, initially, that Byrd stated that she did not question 
Leggett's 
competency with regard to "understanding the nature of the charges, 
what goes on in court [or] the function of the prosecution, the function 
of defense and the function of the Court." While her statements alone are 
not dispositive of the issue, they strongly bolster the conclusion that 
Leggett fully understood his situation. See United States v. Morgano, 39 
F.3d 1358, 1374 (7th Cir. 1994) (defense counsel's averment that 
defendant had ability to understand and participate in proceedings 
"casts grave doubt on the defendant's incompetency"). 
 
6. Both Leggett and the government make reference to the testimony of 
several mental-health experts concerning Leggett's mental condition at 
the time of his attack on Troutman at the prison. Such evidence, 
however, is irrelevant for our purposes because it sheds little light on 
Leggett's mental condition at the time of the pretrial hearing on July 26, 
1995 -- over one year after the assault on Troutman. See United States 
v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1290 (6th Cir. 1996) (defendant's assertion of 
mental incapacity at time of offense does not "permit or require" 
examination of competency for trial). 
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       your rights is. You know, I understand what a knowing 
       and intelligent and knowing and voluntary waiver is. 
 
Thus, Leggett's argument is betrayed by his own 
articulation of an axiom generally observed by courts: i.e., 
" `[i]t does not follow that because a person is mentally ill 
[that person] is not competent to stand trial.' " Davis, 93 
F.3d at 1290 (quoting Newfield v. United States, 565 F.2d 
203, 206 (2d Cir. 1977)); see also Nichols, 56 F.3d at 412 
("It is well-established that some degree of mental illness 
cannot be equated with incompetence to stand trial.") 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Williams, 
998 F.2d at 266 (observing that certain mental disabilities, 
such as "minor neurosis or slight retardation," may not 
render a defendant incompetent to stand trial). If the 
mental illness does not "deprive the defendant of the ability 
. . . to understand the proceedings . . . rationally as well as 
factually," Nichols, 56 F.3d at 412 (citation omitted), then 
the illness is irrelevant for the purposes of determining 
competency. 
 
Although a trial court may consider a defendant's history 
of mental illness, it must "properly focus[ ] its inquiry [on 
the defendant's] mental state at the time of the 
[proceedings]." Morgano, 39 F.2d at 1374 (citation omitted). 
That is, the defendant must not only suffer from a mental 
impairment but must also be "presently" unable to 
understand the nature and consequences of the 
proceedings. 18 U.S.C. S 4241(a). Nothing that Leggett said 
or did during the July 26 hearing suggested that he lacked 
the requisite understanding. A self-proclamation of mental 
illness hardly qualifies as proof of incompetency, especially 
when coupled with a textbook recitation of the necessary 
elements of a legal waiver. Courts have considered behavior 
far more extreme than Leggett's rants to be insufficient to 
warrant a sua sponte competency hearing under section 
4241. 
 
The facts in Lebron strongly mirror those of the present 
case. In Lebron, the defendant, like Leggett, had a lengthy 
history of psychiatric disorders, and was diagnosed as a 
possible schizophrenic. 76 F.3d at 30. At a change-of-plea 
hearing, the defendant threw a pitcher of water at several 
case investigators. Id. at 31. Neither side moved for a 
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competency hearing and, pursuant to a plea agreement, the 
defendant was sentenced. Id. On appeal, the defendant 
argued that the district court should have ordered a 
competency hearing sua sponte due to his "irrational and 
outrageous behavior in the courtroom." Id. at 32. In 
affirming the district court's judgment of sentence and 
rejecting the defendant's argument, the court of appeals for 
the First Circuit expounded, "Such behavior may be 
uncontrolled, manipulative, or even theatrical. It is not 
determinative of competency. Agitated or violent courtroom 
antics alone do not mandate a finding by the trial court of 
reasonable cause." Id. (citing United States v. Marshall, 458 
F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1972)); see also Nichols, 56 F.3d at 
413 (affirming district court's finding that defendant's 
unusual behavior -- i.e., getting down "on all fours" and 
putting his head to the floor -- was " `all calculated 
fakery' "). 
 
Clearly, Leggett's declarations of mental illness were no 
more generative of reasonable cause than was the 
defendant's sudden paroxysm in Lebron. Just as we do not 
want to encourage defendants to fabricate symptoms of 
mental disorders (e.g., violent acts in court) to raise doubts 
about their competency, we also do not want to require 
" `district courts to order competency hearings sua sponte 
in every case where a defendant has some history of 
psychiatric treatment and, even vaguely, mentions the 
problem.' " Lebron, 76 F.3d at 33 (quoting Hernandez- 
Hernandez v. United States, 904 F.2d 758, 760 (1st Cir. 
1990)). Leggett merely mentioned that he had been 
diagnosed in the past as having psychiatric problems. Such 
statements, standing alone, did not give the district court 
reason to believe that Leggett did not grasp the nature and 
consequences of the proceedings against him. 
 
Based on this reasoning, we conclude that the district 
court did not have reasonable cause to believe that Leggett 
(1) was incapable of consulting with an attorney and 
assisting in his defense or (2) did not understand the 
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that, although the district court held a competency hearing 
after the trial and determined that Leggett was competent to appear for 
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B. Right To Testify 
 
We now turn to the issue of whether Leggett was denied 
his right to testify at the trial. We exercise plenary review 
over claims of constitutional violations, such as the denial 
of the right to testify. United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 
9, 10 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
The Supreme Court has held that the right to "testify on 
one's own behalf at a criminal trial" is grounded in three 
provisions of the Constitution.8 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 
44, 51 (1987); see also United States v. Van De Walker, 141 
F.3d 1451, 1452 n.1 (11th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that 
right to testify is constitutional), cert. denied, No. 98-5615, 
1998 WL 480721 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1998); Brown v. Artuz, 124 
F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1997) (same), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 
1077 (1998); Ortega v. O'Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 261 (7th Cir. 
1988) (same). First, the "Fourteenth Amendment's 
guarantee that no one shall be deprived of liberty without 
due process of law include[s] a right to be heard and to 
offer testimony." Rock, 483 U.S. at 51; see also United 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
sentencing, that determination is in no way relevant to our analysis of 
the district court's decision not to order a competency hearing prior to 
the trial. The Supreme Court has noted that a defendant's competency 
at one point of a proceeding does not necessarily mean that the 
defendant has been competent throughout the proceeding. See Drope v. 
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975) ("Even when a defendant is 
competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must always 
be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the 
accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial."). 
For this reason, the district court's posttrial competency determination 
carries no weight with regard to our review of its decision not to order 
an earlier competency hearing. 
 




       [i]n trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses 
       against the United States and in all proceedings in courts martial 
       and courts of inquiry in any State, District, Possession or 
Territory, 
       the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent 
       witness. His failure to make such request shall not create any 
       presumption against him. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3481. 
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States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 118 (3d Cir. 
1977) (right to testify "emanate[s] from the due process 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment") (citation 
omitted). Second, the right to testify also derives from the 
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 
"which grants a defendant the right to call `witnesses in his 
favor.' " Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967)). At times, "the most important 
witness for the defense . . . is the defendant himself." Id. 
Finally, the right to testify is protected by the Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony. Id. 
That is, the privilege to refuse to testify is part and parcel 
of the privilege to testify if one wishes to do so. Id. at 53. 
 
The right is personal and can be waived only by the 
defendant, not defense counsel. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 10; 
Johnson, 555 F.2d at 118 (observing that right to testify 
"can be waived only by the defendant and not by his 
attorney") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1997) ("This 
right [to testify] can be waived only by the defendant, not by 
his counsel."), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jul. 13, 1998) 
(No. 98-5802); Brown, 124 F.3d at 77 ("[E]very circuit that 
has considered this question has placed the defendant's 
right to testify in the `personal rights' category -- i.e., 
waivable only by the defendant himself regardless of 
tactical considerations.") (citations omitted); Ortega, 843 
F.2d at 261 ("If a defendant insists on testifying, no matter 
how unwise such a decision, the attorney must comply with 
the request.") (citation omitted). If a defendant does waive 
this right, the waiver must be knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 11; Emery, 139 F.3d at 
198; Ortega, 843 F.2d at 261. 
 
Leggett argues that the district court took no steps to 
inquire whether he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
waived his right to testify. This argument fails to negotiate 
a rather fundamental hurdle: i.e., the fact that the district 
court had no duty to make such an inquiry. In Pennycooke, 
we unambiguously stated that "a trial court has no duty to 
explain to the defendant that he or she has a right to testify 
or to verify that the defendant who is not testifying has 
waived the right voluntarily." 65 F.3d at 11. This ruling 
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falls in complete agreement with those of the majority of 
courts of appeals that have ruled on this issue. See, e.g., 
Van De Walker, 141 F.3d at 1452; Brown, 124 F.3d at 79; 
Liegakos v. Cooke, 106 F.3d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
United States v. McMeans, 927 F.2d 162, 163 (4th Cir. 
1991) (per curiam); United States v. Edwards, 897 F.2d 
445, 446-47 (9th Cir. 1990); Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29, 
30 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 
749, 752 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 
1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 1983).9 
 
We decided in Pennycooke that a trial court not only has 
no duty to make an inquiry but, as a general rule, should 
not inquire as to the defendant's waiver of the right to 
testify. We explained our reasoning as follows: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Leggett relies heavily on Ortega v. O'Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 263 (7th 
Cir. 
1988), in which the court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that 
"a trial court should carefully ascertain through a methodical inquiry 
whether th[e] right [to testify] has been voluntarily and intelligently 
[waived]." His reliance on this case is misplaced for three reasons. 
First, 
as noted supra, the overwhelming majority of courts of appeals have 
decided that a trial court has no duty to make such an inquiry. Second, 
the facts of Ortega place it within a narrow exception to the general rule 
against a judicial-inquiry requirement since, in that case, the defendant 
told the trial court that his attorney was contravening his desire to 
testify and the trial court did not investigate the matter. 843 F.2d at 
260. See United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9, 12 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(offering Ortega as example of an "exceptional" case in which trial court 
should ensure that defendant's right to testify is protected). The facts 
of 
this case do not place it within the same narrow exception because 
Leggett makes no claim that his attorney actively barred him from 
testifying (we discuss this matter at length infra). Third, the court of 
appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in both Ortega and subsequent opinions, 
has embraced the belief that trial courts generally have no duty to 
inquire about the defendant's decision to testify-- and has thereby 
acknowledged that Ortega presents a narrow exception, not the rule. See, 
e.g., Liegakos v. Cooke, 106 F.3d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that trial court need not ascertain whether defendant has validly waived 
right to testify); United States v. Brimberry, 961 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (same); Ortega, 843 F.2d at 261 ("It is true that courts have 
no affirmative duty to determine whether a defendant's silence is the 
result of a knowing and voluntary decision not to testify.") (citation 
omitted). 
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       [T]he determination of whether the defendant will 
       testify is an important part of trial strategy best left to 
       the defendant and counsel without the intrusion of the 
       trial court, as that intrusion may have the unintended 
       effect of swaying the defendant one way or the other. 
       For example, as a matter of strategy and common 
       sense, the defendant and counsel may wait until well 
       into the trial before deciding whether the defendant will 
       testify. Thus, the trial court may not know that the 
       defendant will not testify until the defense rests. A 
       colloquy on the right to testify at that point not only 
       would be awkward, but more importantly[,] 
       inadvertently might cause the defendant to think that 
       the court believes the defense has been insufficient. 
       This belief in turn might prompt the defendant to 
       abandon an appropriate defense strategy without good 
       reason. 
 
Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 11 (citations omitted). See also Van 
De Walker, 141 F.3d at 1452 (inquiries by trial court 
"would unnecessarily intrude into the attorney-client 
relationship and could unintentionally influence the 
defendant in his or her choice") (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted); Liegakos, 106 F.3d at 1386 
("[W]hether to testify is a fundamental element of a strategy 
that the defendant may want (indeed, may be entitled) to 
keep in confidence. . . . Defendant and his lawyer should 
explore these issues and options carefully, but as a rule the 
judge need not and should not, inquire into the choice of 
defense strategy."). This rationale is rooted in the accepted 
principle that it is defense counsel's responsibility, not the 
trial court's, to make sure that the defendant is informed of 
the right to testify and that any waiver of the right is valid. 
Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 13. See also United States v. 
Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc) 
("[I]t is primarily the responsibility of defense counsel to 
advise the defendant of his right to testify and thereby 
ensure that the right is protected."). 
 
The hypothetical situation we presented in Pennycooke 
mirrors the chain of events at Leggett's trial. Leggett and 
his attorney, Gardner, were apparently debating whether 
Leggett should testify. However, the district court had no 
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way of knowing what they had decided between themselves 
by the time the defense rested its case. The district court 
wisely refrained from holding a colloquy with Leggett on the 
issue, and avoided giving the impression that it thought 
Leggett should testify. Still, Leggett raises two points in 
maintaining that the district court erred in not having such 
a colloquy. Neither point has merit. 
 
First, Leggett observes that Pennycooke recognizes that, 
under certain circumstances, a trial court should inquire as 
to the defendant's decision to testify. While we did observe 
this exception to the general rule, we also took great pains 
to emphasize that it applies on the rarest of occasions. 
We noted that only "in exceptional, narrowly defined 
circumstances" is such judicial intervention appropriate. 
Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 12. To elucidate the point, we 
provided the example of a situation in which "defense 
counsel nullifies a defendant's right to testify over the 
defendant's protest." Id. at 13. Prior to Pennycooke, we 
encountered such a case. In Johnson, the defendant's 
lawyer badgered the defendant into waiving his right to 
testify by threatening to withdraw from the case, which 
would have left the defendant to fend for himself for the 
remainder of the trial. 555 F.2d at 117. We determined that 
the "threatened loss of counsel" violated the defendant's 
constitutional rights and "worked as a lever to pry from [the 
defendant] his . . . right to testify." Id. at 120-21. 
 
There is no indication that Leggett's situation was even 
remotely as dire as that of the defendant in Johnson. 
Leggett merely asserts that, during the course of the trial, 
he was in disagreement with his attorney as to whether he 
should testify. Unfortunately for Leggett, there is no 
constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer who 
agrees with the defendant's trial strategy. United States v. 
Taylor, 128 F.3d 1105, 1108 (7th Cir. 1997). Mere 
disagreement between defendant and counsel with regard 
to strategic decisions does not create a situation severe 
enough to compel a district court to investigate whether the 
defendant's rights are being impinged. As long as it is clear 
that defense counsel has informed the defendant of the 
right to testify and the defendant understands that right, a 
district court has no reason to intervene.10 See id. (no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Leggett makes no claim that he was either unaware of or did not 
understand his right to testify. 
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violation where lawyer disagrees with defendant's decision 
to testify but does not impede defendant's exercise of right 
to testify); Emery, 139 F.3d at 199 (holding that defendant's 
right to testify not violated where defendant understood 
right and attorney did not coerce waiver of the right); 
Noland v. French, 134 F.3d 208, 218 (4th Cir. 1998) (trial 
counsel did not act improperly in failing to put defendant 
on stand when defendant expressed no desire to testify), 
cert. denied, No. 97-9428, 1998 WL 313265 (U.S. Oct. 5, 
1998); Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 
1996) (defendant cannot claim defense attorney acted 
improperly in not advising defendant to testify when 
attorney advised defendant of right to testify and, in fact, 
defendant knew of right beforehand). Thus, mindful that 
judicial inquiry concerning the right to testify "is the 
exception, not the rule," we conclude that Leggett has not 
presented any evidence that his attorney acted to 
"frustrat[e] his . . . desire to testify." Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 
13. As such, Leggett has shown no reason why we should 
apply the narrow Pennycooke exception to this case. 
 
The second point raised by Leggett in support of his 
"right to testify" claim is that the district court openly 
expressed its opinion that he should not testify. The district 
court made two statements in this regard. On November 8, 
1995, the day before both sides concluded their 
presentations of evidence, Gardner expressed concern that, 
contrary to Gardner's advice, Leggett wished to testify. The 
district court told Leggett: 
 
       [Y]ou ought to listen to your lawyer's advi[c]e. He's got 
       a better perspective on this than you do. And as I told 
       you before, if my son were on trial here, I would tell 
       him to follow his lawyer's advice. If I were on trial, I 
       would follow my lawyer's advice, even though I thought 
       it was wrong. And I do think that you should give that 
       the greatest consideration. 
 
Then, on November 9, the district court engaged in this 
exchange at sidebar with Gardner: 
 
       District Court: I didn't want to do this in open Court, 
       but do you have -- I'm not sure of your being entitled 
       to any further evidence, but I wondered whether you 
       had any. 
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       Mr. Gardner: I haven't any. 
 
       District Court: All right. That's fine. I didn't want to say 
       it because I thought [Leggett] might jump up and say 
       he wanted to testify. 
 
Clearly, the district court's comments on both occasions 
were highly inappropriate. As we stressed in Pennycooke, it 
is inadvisable for a trial court to address "a defendant 
directly about his or her waiver of the right to testify." 65 
F.3d at 11. Although we explicitly stated in Pennycooke that 
a trial court should avoid encouraging a defendant to 
testify, a trial court should also avoid discouraging such 
testimony. Any strategic dispute between Leggett and 
Gardner should have been resolved without comment from 
the district court. 
 
The impropriety of the district court's remarks being 
noted, we nonetheless conclude that the district court did 
not commit reversible error. See United States v. Leo, 941 
F.2d 181, 195 (3d Cir. 1991) (ruling that district court's 
restriction of defendant's right to testify could be considered 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt if defendant was 
not prevented from putting forth a complete defense).11 The 
bare facts of the matter are these: (1) the day before the 
defense rested its case, Leggett and his attorney disagreed 
about Leggett's taking the stand; (2) one day later, at the 
close of evidence, Leggett's attorney indicated that he had 
no further evidence to present -- which implicitly meant 
that Leggett would not testify; and (3) Leggett did not then 
and does not now maintain that his attorney acted against 
his wishes. Based on these facts, the district court received 
no indication that Leggett was coerced by his attorney to 
remain silent. The district court could only have assumed 
that, in the 24-hour period leading to the close of evidence, 
Gardner had convinced Leggett that testifying was not in 
his best interests. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500, 
1508 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Without evidence that [the 
defendant] was subject to continued coercion, we cannot 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Although the government does not argue that the district court's 
actions constituted harmless error, we have discretion to apply 
harmless-error analysis to those actions. United States v. McLaughlin, 
126 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2366 (1998). 
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assume that [the defendant's] apparent acquiescence to a 
trial strategy in which he did not testify was anything but 
voluntary."), aff'd, 520 U.S. 518 (1997). 
 
Leggett makes much of the fact that the district court 
asked Gardner at sidebar whether the defense had any 
further evidence to present. Yet, the mere fact that the 
district court asked for any further evidence at sidebar still 
would not suggest that Leggett was denied the right to 
testify unless one of two possibilities were true: either (1) 
Leggett was not informed of his right to testify up to that 
point or (2) Gardner defied Leggett's instructions and 
offered no further evidence when Leggett had planned to 
testify before the close of evidence. The first scenario clearly 
does not apply since Leggett had asserted his right to testify 
earlier in the trial. One who asserts the right to testify 
cannot later claim ignorance of that right. See id. at 1508 
(finding defendant's claim that he was uninformed of right 
to testify dubious since defendant asserted right at earlier 
trial based on same charges). The second scenario seems 
equally baseless. To reiterate an earlier point, Leggett has 
not argued in this appeal that Gardner misrepresented his 
position. Furthermore, Leggett made several postconviction 
pro se motions but not one was based on the denial of the 
right to testify. If he had been planning to testify, one would 
expect that the denial of that right would have been one of 
the first bases he would have claimed in trying to overturn 
his conviction.12 Therefore, although we find that the 
district court rashly injected itself into a discourse better 
left to the attorney and client, that imprudence did not 
result in a violation of Leggett's right to testify. Leggett was 
aware of his right to testify and his lawyer did nothing to 
prevent him from testifying. There is no evidence to the 
contrary. 
 
To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) under the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We note also that Leggett has made no claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel -- a claim which would at least be colorable if Gardner had 
kept him from testifying against his will. See Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (convicted defendant may claim lawyer was 
ineffective if lawyer did not function as "counsel" during trial and if 
lawyer's actions prejudiced the defense). 
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circumstances of this case, the district court had no duty 
to ascertain whether Leggett had validly waived his right to 
testify; (2) Leggett's disagreement with trial counsel over 
testifying did not create the exceptional circumstances 
necessary to warrant judicial inquiry; and (3) the district 
court's involvement in the dispute between Leggett and his 
attorney, while inappropriate, did not amount to reversible 
error because there is no evidence that Leggett had any 
intention of testifying on November 9 before the close of 
evidence. For these reasons, we reject Leggett's claim that 
the district court denied him the right to testify. 
 
C. Forfeiture of the Right to Counsel 
 
Finally, we turn to Leggett's claim that the district court 
improperly determined that he forfeited his right to counsel 
at sentencing by physically attacking his lawyer. We 
exercise plenary review over claims alleging denial of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. United States v. 
Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
This case raises the issue of forfeiture of the right to 
counsel. Forfeiture, however, is often confused with the 
closely related -- but distinct -- concept of waiver. See, e.g., 
United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 258 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(concluding that defendant "waive[d]" right to counsel while 
resting decision on notion of forfeiture); Yale Kamisar et al., 
Modern Criminal Procedure, 1598 n.b (8th ed. 1994) (noting 
that some courts refer to "waiver" as "forfeiture"). In the 
interest of clarity, we shall initially note the distinction 
between the two concepts. A waiver is "an intentional and 
voluntary relinquishment of a known right." Goldberg, 67 
F.3d at 1099 (citing, inter alia, Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold 
H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, S 11.3(c), at 546 n.4 (2d ed. 
1992)); United States v. McCleod, 53 F.3d 322, 325 n.6 
(11th Cir. 1995) ("We discuss `forfeiture' rather than `waiver' 
because waiver implies `an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right.' ") (citation omitted). Most commonly, one 
waives a constitutional right by an "affirmative, verbal 
request" (e.g., requests to proceed pro se or to plead guilty). 
Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099. It is well established that any 
waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary 
and intelligent. United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 218 
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(3d Cir. 1995); Government of the Virgin Islands v. James, 
934 F.2d 468, 470 (3d Cir. 1991); McMahon v. Fulcomer, 
821 F.2d 934, 944 (3d Cir. 1987). With regard to ensuring 
that a waiver is valid, the trial court's responsibility varies 
-- depending on the right being waived. As we discussed in 
depth earlier, a trial court has no duty to ascertain that a 
waiver of the right to testify is valid. By contrast, if a 
defendant elects to waive the right to counsel, a trial court 
must make sure that the defendant has "an awareness of 
the dangers and disadvantages inherent in defending 
oneself." United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 
1982); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 
(1975) (trial record must show that defendant who waives 
right to counsel " `knows what he is doing and [that] his 
choice is made with eyes open' ") (citation omitted). 
 
Forfeiture, on the other hand, does not require the 
knowing and intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
Rather, forfeiture "results in the loss of a right regardless of 
the defendant's knowledge thereof and irrespective of 
whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right." 
Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100. To forfeit the right to legal 
representation, a defendant must engage in "extremely 
serious misconduct." Id. at 1102. For example, in McCleod, 
a defendant's attorney testified that the defendant was 
"verbally abusive"; had "threatened to harm[the attorney]"; 
had threatened to sue the attorney; and had tried to 
persuade the attorney to engage in unethical conduct. 53 
F.3d at 325. The district court concluded that the 
defendant's behavior was so egregious as to constitute a 
forfeiture of the right to counsel -- and the court of appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit agreed by affirming that decision. 
Id. at 326. 
 
Leggett's conduct was even more extreme than that of the 
defendant in McCleod. Whereas the McCleod defendant's 
abuse of his attorney was verbal in nature, Leggett's abuse 
was an unprovoked physical battery. We do not hesitate to 
conclude that such an attack qualifies as the sort of 
"extremely serious misconduct" that amounts to the 
forfeiture of the right to counsel. Goldberg, 67 F.2d at 1102. 
 
Leggett argues that the requirements of Goldberg were 
not satisfied by the district court when it concluded that 
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Leggett forfeited his right to a lawyer. We disagree. In 
Goldberg, a defendant's attorney alleged that the defendant 
had threatened his life. 67 F.3d at 1095. The district court 
concluded that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel 
by threatening the life of his attorney. Id. at 1096-97 
(noting that district court used term "waiver" even though 
it was actually applying forfeiture principle). We reversed 
the district court's ruling but did not base our decision on 
the severity of the defendant's misconduct. (Certainly, it 
would be difficult to quantify a death threat as any more or 
less offensive to the sensibilities of civilized society than, 
say, an actual physical assault. Both acts are 
reprehensible.) Instead, we reversed the district court's 
ruling because its factual findings concerning the death 
threat were made at a hearing to which the defendant was 
not a party. Id. at 1102. We concluded that a forfeiture 
ruling could not be based entirely on evidence presented at 
an ex parte hearing. Id. 
 
No such evidentiary problem exists in this case. An 
evidentiary hearing was not necessary because Leggett 
assaulted Gardner in full view of the district court. 
Furthermore, at the subsequent competency hearing (at 
which Leggett was represented by counsel), the district 
court did consider the possibility that Leggett was not in 
control of his faculties when he assailed Gardner-- though 
it did ultimately conclude that he was responsible for his 
actions.13 Thus, Leggett benefited from two elements which 
were not present in Goldberg: (1) a direct presentation of 
evidence before the district court (i.e., the occurrence of the 
attack itself) and (2) participation in an adversarial 
proceeding to contest the forfeiture. Since we based our 
decision in Goldberg on the absence of these factors and 
since those factors are present in this case, we reject 
Leggett's argument that the requirements of Goldberg were 
not satisfied by the district court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. In denying Leggett's motion for the appointment of counsel after the 
attack and at the conclusion of the competency hearing, the district 
court remarked, "[N]o evidence presented at th[e competency] hearing 
supports Leggett's assertion that after engaging in an argument with his 
counsel, allowing 20 seconds to pass, and then assaulting his counsel, 
such actions were not voluntary." 
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In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in 
determining that, by physically attacking his attorney, 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's judgment of conviction and sentence. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We note that the forfeiture of counsel at sentencing does not deal as 
serious a blow to a defendant as would the forfeiture of counsel at the 
trial itself. For a number of reasons (e.g., the inapplicability of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence), sentencing hearings " `demand much less 
specialized knowledge than trials.' " United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 
214, 220 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Day, 998 F.2d 622, 626 
(1st Cir. 1993)). We underscore that the district court in this case made 
its forfeiture ruling at the sentencing stage, not during the trial 
itself. We 
express no opinion as to whether Leggett's misconduct would have been 
sufficient to justify the forfeiture of counsel during the trial. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part, and concurring in 
part. 
 
I agree that the defendant waived his right to counsel at 
sentencing, and I concur dubitante in the majority's 
holding that the district court did not err in not ordering a 
competency examination.1 However, I respectfully dissent 
from my colleagues' conclusion that the defendant "validly 
waived his right to testify." Maj. Op. at 2. Indeed, the 
majority misstates the issue. The issue is not whether the 
defendant "validly waived" his right to testify. He did not 
waive it at all. Instead, he was deprived of the opportunity 
to testify after he and his attorney informed the court that 
he wanted to do so. Accordingly, the majority's discussion 
of waiver is misplaced. Rather, the issue here is whether 
the district court violated a duty of inquiry under United 
States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9 (3d Cir. 1995). Because I 
believe that the district court's failure to inquire was a clear 





It is well settled that a criminal defendant has a 
constitutional right to testify in his or her own behalf. Rock 
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-53 (1987). The decision 
belongs to the defendant and may not be made by trial 
counsel, or the court. See, e.g., Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 
73, 77 (2d Cir. 1997); Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 10. Moreover, 
"[t]he wisdom or unwisdom of the defendant's choice does 
not diminish his right to make it." United States v. Teague, 
953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Wright v. 
Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1079 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, J., 
dissenting)). Further, "the right to testify on one's own 
behalf at a criminal trial . . . is one of the rights that `are 
essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.' " 
Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 819, n.15 (1975)). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I define my concurrence in that issue as "dubitante" to signify that I 
have reservations about that decision. See Salvation Army v. Dept. of 
Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 202 n.1. (3d Cir. 1990). 
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Leggett wanted to exercise that right. He told the trial 
judge so. His attorney told the judge so, though he also 
informed the court that he advised against it. The majority 
agrees that defense counsel's opposition is irrelevant to our 
analysis. See Maj. Op. at 14 ("The right is personal and can 
be waived only by the defendant, not defense counsel") 
(citing Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 10). The trial court obviously 
thought Leggett was competent to participate in his own 
defense when he told the court he wanted to testify, and 
today we uphold that conclusion. Yet, to put it mildly, the 
trial judge was not particularly impressed with Leggett's 
assertion of his right. The court first responded by urging 
Leggett to follow his lawyer's advice. The majority has 
already commented upon the colloquy in which the trial 
court urged Leggett to take his lawyer's advice, and 
mentioned the extent to which the judge attempted to get 
Leggett to follow that advice. See Maj. Op. at 18. My 
colleagues conclude that the court's comments then, and at 
a subsequent side bar "were highly inappropriate." Maj. Op. 
at 19. Indeed they were. They also constituted a breach of 
the trial court's obligation to allow Leggett to testify in his 
own behalf as is evidenced by the following exchange 
between defense counsel, the court, and the defendant: 
 
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'm not resting at this point, 
       but I intend to rest. Now, Mr. Leggett has indicated to 
       me that he wants to testify. . . . I have advised him 
       against testifying. . . . I don't think it's in his best 
       interest . . . . He does not want to take that advice, 
       apparently, and he's -- at least up until now. I don't 
       know whether he's changed his mind to insist on 
       testifying. 
 
       [COURT]: Why don't you talk to him over the lunch 
       hour. And if he wants to take the stand, what is your 
       view as to whether -- I mean, aside from the right of it, 
       do you think he has the right to take the stand? 
 
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think he does, Your Honor. 
 
       [COURT]: All right. Well, what are you asking us to do, 
       if anything? 
 
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, your Honor, if he takes -- 
       if he insists on taking the stand, I'm not sure what my 
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       role is at that point other than asking him his name, 
       because I don't -- I think it's self-defeating for this man 
       to testify. 
 
       * * * 
 
       Now, as far as what -- what my obligation is -- I think 
       that the Court ought to advise Mr. Leggett that, you 
       know, your lawyer has told you that it's not in your 
       best interests to testify. However, you do have a right. 
       . . . [I]f he says, yes, I wish to take the witness stand, 
       I don't have any questions prepared to ask him, other 
       than what's your name and what do you have to say to 
       the jury on your behalf. 
 
       * * * 
 
       [COURT] [addressing the prosecutor]: Well, what is 
       wrong with Mr. Gardner asking his witness -- asking 
       his client, if the client insists on taking -- I don't know 
       whether Judge McClure is waiting out there or not. .. . 
       We are late . . . . I throw this out for consideration. Mr. 
       Gardner might properly ask him, well, what happened 
       with respect to . . . whatever the gentleman's name 
       was. What happened at that incident. Do you think 
       there's something wrong with that? 
 
       [PROSECUTOR]: At a minimum I think that should be 
       asked, Judge. 
 
       [COURT]: All right. Do you see anything wrong with 
       that? 
 
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . I don't know what Mr. 
       Leggett's going to say. I'm at a loss. I never put a 
       witness on the stand like Mr. Leggett before. And 
       nothing that I've said or discussed with him over the 
       past months has given me any indication of what he's 
       going to say when he gets on the witness stand, other 
       than ideation and these hallucinations and delusion. 
 
       [COURT]: Of course, that may be very helpful to you. 
 
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Again, like I say, I don't know 
       what the man's going to say. 
 
       [COURT]: I'm perfectly willing to tell Mr. Leggett what 
       I told him before, that you ought to listen to your 
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       lawyer's advise.[sic] . . . If I were on trial, I would follow 
       my lawyer's advice, even though I thought it was 
       wrong. And I do think that you should give that the 
       greatest consideration. 
 
        What more do you think I ought to tell him, if 
       anything? 
 
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That his criminal record may 
       come out if he takes the stand. 
 
       * * * 
 
       [COURT]: Well, he knows that. . . . What else? 
 
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That he may -- well, in my 
       opinion, he's going to -- it's going to be self-defeating 
       and he's going to destroy any possibility of an acquittal 
       in this case. 
 
       [COURT]: Well, I think there's question about that. He 
       may be so far off base that it might win this case for 
       him. So I don't know what more you want me to say. 
 
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's [sic] suffices, Your 
       Honor. 
 
       * * * 
 
       [DEFENDANT]: I can't talk? 
 
       [COURT]: What did you want to say? 
 
       [DEFENDANT]: I wanted to say this here. This lawyer 
       ain't been talking to me. If he would have been talking 
       to me, he would know what I was going to say on the 
       witness stand. That shows that this man is giving me 
       ineffective assistance. He taking about he don't know 
       what I'm going to say on the stand. 
 
       * * * 
 
       [COURT]: Just a minute. . . . The law clerks and I have 
       discussed Mr. Gardner's performance in this case, and 
       we think it is remarkably good, and -- so don't tell me 
       that he's giving you ineffective assistance. He's going 
       [sic] an excellent job. 
 
       * * * 
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       [DEFENDANT]: Well, what I'm -- 
 
       [COURT]: Just a second. I have got appointment [sic] 
       with another judge. You know it. I am seven minutes 
       late. I am going to keep it, and this Court's in recess. 
 
App. at 148-151. The defendant responded "How did I 
know? You didn't tell me you had no appointment." Supp. 
App. at 125. A luncheon recess was then called. When 
court resumed a witness was called out of order, and the 
government proceeded with rebuttal. The court never 
inquired further of Leggett. The next day, immediately prior 
to the close of the case, the judge, prosecutor and defense 
counsel had the following discussion: 
 
       [PROSECUTOR]: The prosecution has no other rebuttal 
       witness, Your Honor. We would move into evidence 
       certain of the documents the Court has previously seen 
       today, but we can do that out of the presence of the 
       jury. 
 
       [COURT]: Okay. All right. May I see counsel, please. 
 
       (at sidebar) 
 
       I didn't want to do this in open Court, but do you have 
       -- I'm not sure of your being entitled to any further 
       evidence, but I wondered whether you had any. 
 
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I haven't any. 
 
       [COURT]: All right. That's fine. I didn't want to say it 
       because I thought he might jump up and say he wanted 
       to testify. 
 
App. at 163 (emphasis added). 
 
The majority holds that this scenario does not fall within 
the "exceptional, narrowly defined circumstances" that 
require "a direct colloquy with a defendant . . . to ensure 
that the defendant's right to testify is protected." 
Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 12. If it doesn't, then I am hard 




Pennycooke established that a trial judge usually has no 
such duty of inquiry. Our reasoning there was based upon 
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the personal nature of the right to testify in one's own 
behalf, the dangers of the trial court intruding into matters 
of strategy, and the danger that unintended consequences 
could result thus interfering with the exercise of a 
fundamental constitutional right rather than protecting it. 
Id. at 11-12. Nevertheless, as noted above, we recognized 
that "exceptional, narrowly defined circumstances" could 
require "judicial interjection through a direct colloquy to 
ensure that the defendant's right to testify is protected." Id. 
at 12. The majority recognizes this, but hastens to add: "we 
also took great pains to emphasize that it applies on the 
rarest of occasions." Maj. Op. at 17. Indeed we did. 
However, that qualifier does not establish that this is not 
such an occasion. 
 
My colleagues conclude that this is not such an occasion 
by characterizing the events that transpired during the trial 
as a "[m]ere disagreement between defendant and counsel 
with regard to strategic decisions." They conclude that the 
"disagreement" "does not create a situation severe enough 
to compel a district court to investigate whether the 
defendant's rights are being impinged." Maj. Op. at 17. 
However, "every circuit that has considered this question 
has placed the defendant's right to testify in the `personal 
rights' category -- i.e., waivable only by the defendant 
himself regardless of tactical considerations." Artuz, 124 
F.3d at 77. 
 
Furthermore, even assuming this was a "mere 
disagreement" over strategy, it was still a violation of the 
holding in Pennycooke to only ask defense counsel if his 
client wanted to testify, and make absolutely no inquiry of 
the defendant. See Ortega v. O'Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 261 
n.2 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that it is error to question only 
the attorney about a defendant's desire to testify where 
defendant interrupts a trial to express a desire to do so). 
Not only did the trial court address its inquiry only to 
counsel, it did so in a manner that prevented the defendant 
from responding, or objecting to his attorney's response. In 
fact, the defendant did not even know that the trial court 
had asked the question of his attorney. It is true that 
Leggett did not request to testify following the sidebar when 
his attorney informed the court that he had no additional 
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evidence to present. It is also irrelevant. How could he 
make such a request? Leggett could not very well have 
disrupted the proceedings by standing in open court and 
speaking directly to the judge without being asked 
anything. That was the choice that the judge's side bar left 
him. This jury was about to determine his fate. Surely, 
Leggett's failure to jump to his feet in front of the jury and 
insist that he be allowed to speak can not equate with a 
waiver of the right he had asserted just the preceding day. 
Ironically, Leggett may have done exactly that (jump to his 
feet and assert his right to testify as the judge feared) had 
he known what was going on. The judge realized that. He 
called defense counsel to sidebar to prevent it. Thus, the 
majority places far too much importance on Leggett's failure 
to speak out in front of the jury. That silence establishes 
nothing more than the success of the court's efforts to 
silence Leggett and prevent him from "jump[ing] up and 
say[ing] he wanted to testify". 
 
The majority attempts to minimize the trial judge's 
attempt to keep Leggett from jumping up and asserting his 
right to testify as follows: 
 
       The bare facts of the matter are these: (1) the day 
       before the defense rested its case, Leggett and his 
       attorney disagreed about Leggett's taking the stand; (2) 
       one day later, at the close of evidence, Leggett's 
       attorney indicated that he had no further evidence to 
       present -- which implicitly meant that Leggett would 
       not testify; and (3) Leggett did not then and does not 
       now maintain that his attorney acted against his 
       wishes. Based on these facts, the district court received 
       no indication that Leggett was coerced by his attorney 
       to remain silent. The district court could only have 
       assumed that, in the 24-hour period leading to the 
       close of evidence, Gardner had convinced Leggett that 
       testifying was not in his best interests. 
 
Maj. Op. at 19-20 ((citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 
1500, 1508 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Without evidence that [the 
defendant] was subject to continued coercion, we cannot 
assume that [the defendant's] apparent acquiescence to a 
trial strategy in which he did not testify was anything but 
voluntary."), aff'd, 520 U.S. 518 (1997)). Although this 
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explanation is based on the record, the majority's 
conclusion as to what the district court assumed is rank 
speculation, not "bare facts." Moreover, that conjecture is 
contradicted by the trial judge's own statements at side bar. 
If the judge "could only have assumed that . . . Gardner 
had convinced Leggett that testifying was not in his best 
interest" I am at a loss to understand the judge's own 
explanation that he was speaking to Gardner at sidebar so 
that Leggett would not "jump up and say he wanted to 
testify." 
 
Nothing that had transpired during the trial would have 
caused the trial judge to conclude that Leggett and his 
attorney had finally found a way to communicate on the eve 
of the close of the trial. Rather, all that had gone before, 
including the statements of Leggett, and his attorney, 
suggested Leggett continued to insist on taking the stand 
against advice of counsel even though the judge had 
attempted to cajole him into following his attorney's advice. 
Moreover, even if the judge had somehow reached the 
conclusion that during the preceding 24 hours, defense 
counsel and Leggett experienced an epiphany that had 
brought about a renaissance of communication between 
them, the trial court still had a duty of inquiry under 
Pennycooke to ascertain whether Leggett (and not his 
counsel) had made that decision, or whether counsel was 
failing to call Leggett against Leggett's wishes based upon a 
dispute over strategy.2 Defense counsel candidly conceded 
that he was "at a loss" and that he "had never put a 
witness on the stand like Mr. Leggett before." Moreover, the 
majority's willingness to find a waiver from defendant's 
failure to respond following the sidebar would be troubling 
even if waiver were the issue here. "A reviewing court must 
`indulge every presumption against waiver of fundamental 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Defense counsel's familiarity with the personal nature of the right to 
testify was such that the trial court should have been even more 
concerned about who was making the decision. When initially asked if 
he thought his client had the right to testify, defense counsel responded: 
"Well, Your Honor, as I said, I've talked to lawyers that I respect and do 
a lot of criminal law about this issue, last week and also yesterday. And 
they both said that they believe that Mr. Leggett has the right to -- 
constitutional right to testify." App. at 148A. 
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constitutional rights.' " Ortega v. Leary, 843 F. 2d 258, 261 
(7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
464 (1938)). 
 
The majority cites Lambrix v. Singletary to support its 
supposition that the trial judge "could only" have assumed 
that Leggett and his attorney had resolved their differences 
the night before. There, the defendant was tried before a 
jury on charges of murder. The jury deadlocked. Lambrix 
was retried and received the death penalty following 
conviction. On appeal he raised several issues including 
whether he was entitled to the benefit of the holding in 
Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992), that had been 
decided following his conviction. See Teague v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288, 294 (1989). He also argued that his trial attorney 
rendered ineffective assistance by coercing him into not 
taking the witness stand. The Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held 
that the defendant's claim that he had improperly been 
coerced into not testifying was without merit because the 
only supporting evidence related solely to his first trial. 
Since the remedy would have been a new trial, the court 
reasoned that the defendant could not prevail as he had 
already received a new trial based upon the first jury not 
reaching a verdict. The court also held that there was 
"simply no evidence in the record that Lambrix was coerced 
not to testify in his second trial," despite his claim that the 
coercion lingered. See Lambrix, 72 F.3d at 1508. The 
Supreme Court affirmed, but only discussed the issues 
arising under Teague. The Court did not address Lambrix's 





I am, of course, mindful that the trial judge here was 
trying to maintain order during this trial, and that Mr. 
Leggett was no doubt a rather difficult defendant. I am also 
mindful that Leggett's contumacious proclivities are 
irrelevant. "[A] contentious defendant has no fewer rights 
than a sympathetic one." Ortega, 843 F.2d at 261. Thus, I 
can only conclude that my colleagues' decision today will be 
yet another example of the old adage that "hard cases make 
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bad law." The majority decision will also go a long way 
toward eroding the holding in Pennycooke, as it will serve 
as an example of a situation that does not create a duty of 
inquiry despite the "exceptional, narrowly defined 
circumstances" here. That conclusion cannot be supported 
on this record. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from 
Part IIB of the majority opinion. 
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